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Humans are unique among mammals in a number of ways. One 
of the more distinctive human features is their prolonged period of 
immaturity and dependence on others before reaching a suffi cient 
competence for survival. In fact, in all human societies parents 
must provide their offspring with food and care for about a decade, 
if not more (Bogin, 1994).
Typically in traditional societies “the problem of child care” 
has been solved by the use of alloparents, people other than the 
genetic parents who provide care for children (Lancy, 2015). One 
particularly important class of alloparents is adolescents. For 
example, Bogin (1994) reports that in different types of traditional 
societies (hunter/gatherers, horticulturalists) adolescence is a time 
when parenting skills are learned and practiced before reproduction 
takes place. Bogin argued that the signifi cant differences found 
in the rates of offspring survival until adulthood among human 
traditional societies, chimpanzees, and social carnivores such 
lions (50%, 35%, and 12% respectively), as well as between fi rst 
born and next born in other species (e.g., Altmann, 1980), supports 
the hypothesis that adolescence in humans evolved to provide 
individuals with the time required to acquire the complex social 
skills needed to become competent parents.
Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas (2010) proposed that to 
guarantee the care needed for the survival of vulnerable offspring, 
several adaptations were shaped over our species’ evolutionary 
history: (a) an effective response to neotenous cues and distress 
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Abstract Resumen
Background: Young children often use magical explanations to account 
for ordinary phenomena (e.g., “The sun’s not out today because it is 
mad”). We labeled these explanations supernatural thinking. Previous 
research reports that supernatural thinking attributed to preschool-age 
children evokes both positive affect and perceptions of helplessness from 
both adults and older (14-17 years old) but not younger (10-13 years old) 
adolescents. In this study, we asked if cues of cognitive immaturity are 
more infl uential in affecting adolescents’ judgments of children than 
physical cues (faces). Method: 245 adolescents aged between 10 and 17 
rated pairs of children who physically and/or cognitively resembled either 
a 4- to 7-year-old or an 8- to 10-year-old child in three between-subject 
conditions (Consistent, Inconsistent, Faces-Only) for 14 traits classifi ed 
into four trait dimensions (Positive Affect, Negative Affect, Intelligence, 
Helplessness). Results: For both younger and older adolescents, cognitive 
cues had a greater infl uence on judgments than facial cues. However, only 
the older adolescents demonstrated a positive bias for children expressing 
immature supernatural thinking. Conclusions: Adopting an evolutionary 
developmental perspective, we interpreted this outcome in late (but not 
early) adolescence as preparation for potential parenthood.
Keywords: Cognitive immaturity, adolescence, parenthood, evolutionary 
developmental psychology.
Receptividad de los adolescentes al pensamiento sobrenatural de 
los niños: ¿una preparación para la paternidad? Antecedentes: los 
niños pequeños emplean a menudo explicaciones mágicas para referirse 
a fenómenos cotidianos (por ejemplo, “El sol no sale hoy porque está 
enfadado”). Nosotros etiquetamos estas explicaciones como pensamiento 
sobrenatural. Investigaciones anteriores muestran que el pensamiento 
sobrenatural atribuido a niños en edad preescolar evoca afecto positivo 
y percepción de desamparo en adultos y adolescentes mayores (14-17 
años) pero no en adolescentes jóvenes (10-13 años). En este estudio nos 
preguntamos si las señales de inmadurez cognitiva son más infl uyentes 
en los juicios de los adolescentes que las señales físicas (caras). Método: 
245 adolescentes de 10 a 17 años evaluaron pares de niños que emulaban 
físicamente y/o cognitivamente a niños de 4 a 7 años o niños de 8 a 10 
años en tres condiciones (Consistente, Inconsistente, Solo-Caras) respecto 
a 14 rasgos clasifi cados en cuatro dimensiones (Afecto Positivo, Afecto 
Negativo, Inteligencia, Desamparo). Resultados: tanto en adolescentes 
jóvenes como en mayores, las señales cognitivas tuvieron mayor infl uencia 
que las señales faciales. Sin embargo, solo los adolescentes mayores 
mostraron un sesgo positivo hacia niños que expresaban pensamientos 
sobrenaturales. Conclusión: adoptando una perspectiva evolucionista 
del desarrollo, interpretamos este resultado en la adolescencia tardía (no 
temprana) como preparación para la paternidad.
Palabras clave: inmadurez cognitiva, adolescencia, paternidad, psicología 
evolucionista del desarrollo.
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vocalizations; (b) specifi c tactile behaviors such as skin-to-skin 
contact; (c) attachment-related behaviors; and (d) the possibility 
to experience compassionate emotion. In this context, offsprings’ 
signals providing cues to adults regarding their maturity, health, 
and the degree of urgency of their needs, along with adults’ 
positive attitude toward the children emitting these signals, 
become important. These cues can be physical (e.g., facial features 
described by Lorenz, 1943), behavioral (e.g., clumsy movements, 
smiling, Bowlby, 1969), or vocal (e.g., infants’ crying as cues to 
health, Soltis, 2004). 
In recent years, we and our colleagues have investigated the 
effects on adults’ and adolescents’ judgments of children for 
cues of cognitive immaturity, analogous to the cues of physical 
immaturity originally proposed by Lorenz (Bjorklund, Hernández 
Blasi, & Periss, 2010; Hernández Blasi, Bjorklund, & Ruiz Soler, 
2015, 2017; Periss, Hernández Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2012). More 
specifi cally, we have investigated the infl uence that some children’s 
verbalized immature explanations of ordinary phenomena (e.g., 
why clouds block the sun; why some mountain have big and 
small peaks) have on adults’ and adolescents’ perception of them. 
We have found that some forms of immature cognition, such as 
those described by Piaget (1926) typifying the preoperational 
period (e.g., animism, “The sun’s not out today because it’s mad”; 
fi nalism, “The big peak is for long walks, and the small peak 
is for short walks”), have positive effects on adults’ and older 
adolescents’ (14 to 17 years old) perception of children, but not on 
younger adolescents (10 to 13 years old). In contrast, other forms of 
immature cognition (e.g., overestimating one’s performance, “I can 
remember all 20 words!”; having diffi culty inhibiting responses, 
“I couldn’t avoid peeking in the box!”), had negative effects on 
adults’ and both younger and older adolescents’ judgments of the 
children professing them. We labeled the former type of immature 
cognition supernatural thinking (because it seems to share a 
supernatural or magical explanation of a natural phenomenon), 
and the latter type of immature cognition natural thinking. We 
have also found that the effects of children’s supernatural thinking 
on adults’ judgments prevail over the effect of facial cues when 
presented together (Hernández Blasi et al., 2015, 2017).
We suggested (Bjorklund et al., 2010; Periss et al., 2012) that the 
reason why children’s immature supernatural thinking provokes 
positive reactions (and immature natural thinking does not) might 
have to do with the fact that some forms of magical causation involved 
in this type of thinking are characteristic of adults (see Subbotsky, 
2014), increasing sympathy and/or empathy toward children who 
verbalize them. In contrast, immature natural thinking is perceived 
by adults as a “cognitive error” or mistakes, and therefore is not 
seen as something endearing in children, provoking negative affect. 
Moreover, the fact that this pattern is found in older but not younger 
adolescents is consistent with the preparation of older adolescents 
for their near future potential role as parents.
One unexplored issue is adolescents’ reactions to young 
children’s supernatural thinking when simultaneously presented 
with physical-appearance cues, i.e., faces. Although one might 
expect adolescents to display the same pattern as adults (i.e., 
cognitive cues prevailing over physical cues), such a conclusion 
may not be warranted. For instance, some research (Fullard & 
Reiling, 1976) reports that the fi rst signifi cant bias towards “baby-
like” faces begins in early adolescence, making tenable that the 
impact of physical cues will be stronger than the effect of cognitive 
cues not only during early but also late adolescence, a reversal of 
the adult pattern. Alternatively, if as other research has found (e.g., 
Borgi et al., 2014), a positive sensitivity toward “baby-like” faces 
is already present in childhood, one might expect that the novelty 
provided by cognitive cues would be more informative for younger 
adolescents than physical cues in terms of immaturity status, 
making their reaction in favor of supernatural-thinking cues over 
physical cues even stronger than found in adults.
The main objective of this study was to determine if the 
advantage provided by children’s cognitive over facial cues on 
adults’ reactions toward children, documented and replicated 
for adults (Hernández Blasi et al., 2015, 2017), is also present in 
adolescence; and if so, if the effect varies for younger (10 to 13 
years old) and older (14 to 17 years old) adolescents, consistent 
with patterns of judgments for natural and supernatural vignettes 
reported by Periss et al. (2012). No prediction about sex differences 
was made, given the inconsistencies found in our previous studies 
regarding this variable.          
 
Method
Participants
 
The sample comprised 245 10- to 17-year-old adolescents, 
recruited from several public and private schools in Castellón, 
Spain. They represented a broad range of backgrounds and 
socioeconomic levels. We divided participants into two groups: 
younger adolescents, ages 10 to 13 years (n = 115, 51 boys; M = 
12.0 years, SD = 1.3), and older adolescents, ages 14 to 17 years (n 
= 130, 69 boys; M = 16.3 years, SD = 0.8).
Instruments
 
The methodology and questionnaires were based on Hernández 
Blasi et al. (2015). Questionnaires were booklets composed of four 
double-sided pages, with a cover page where simple instructions were 
provided, and age, gender, and educational level of the participant 
was recorded. In the rest of pages, four pair-comparisons were 
presented successively so that, for each pair, participants could see 
simultaneously two children’s pictures in high quality resolution 
located on their left side, and a listing of 14 traits or short statements 
about these children on their right side.  Participants were assigned 
to three between-subjects conditions: Consistent, Inconsistent, 
and Faces-Only. In the fi rst two conditions, questionnaires were 
composed of four pair-comparisons that included both a vignette 
and a photograph of a child’s face. Two of these pairs included a 
vignette attributed to a child expressing immature supernatural 
thinking (e.g., animism, “The sun’s not out today because it’s mad”) 
and a vignette attributed to a child expressing mature cognition 
(e.g., “The sun’s not out today because clouds are blocking it”). The 
other two pairs included vignettes attributed to a child expressing 
immature natural thinking (e.g., overestimation, “I can remember 
all 20 cards!”) and a vignette expressing a mature version of the 
same thought (e.g., “I can remember 6 or 7 cards”).
In the Consistent condition (39 younger adolescents, 44 older 
adolescents), each immature vignette was matched with a photo 
of a child’s face manipulated to resemble approximately a 4- to 
7-year-old child, whereas each mature vignette was matched with a 
photo of the same child manipulated to resemble approximately an 
8- to 10-year-old child. In the Inconsistent condition (37 younger 
adolescents, 41 older adolescents), each immature vignette was 
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matched with the photo of the mature child’s face, whereas each 
mature vignette was matched with the photo of the immature 
child’s face. In the Faces-Only condition (39 younger adolescents, 
45 older adolescents), only immature vs. mature photographs of 
the same child were depicted. For each participant, two of the 
pairs were boys and two were girls. The procedure for morphing 
and selecting the photos of the children are described in detail in 
Hernández Blasi et al. (2015).  
For every pair-comparison in each condition, adolescents 
decided which of the two children illustrated better a series of 
14 traits, refl ecting a wide range of characteristics potentially 
relevant in interactions with young children. Based on principal-
component analyses of our previous studies for Spanish samples 
(Hernández Blasi et al., 2017; Periss et al., 2012), we organized 
these traits into four main groups: Positive Affect (Cute, Friendly, 
Nice, Likeable), Negative Affect (Sneaky, Likely to lie, Feel 
more angry with, Feel more irritated with), Intelligence (Smart, 
Intelligent), and Helpless (Helpless, Feel more protective towards, 
Feel like helping). (The item Curious did not load highly on any 
factor and was not included in subsequent analyses).
Procedure
Questionnaires were administered in small groups in quiet 
rooms by school personnel under researchers’ supervision and 
with both the parents’ and adolescents’ consent. The different 
questionnaire versions of each condition were assigned at random 
to the participants.
Data analysis
 
Participants’ choices were coded as 1 when they selected the 
child represented by the immature vignettes and 0 when they 
selected the child represented by the mature vignettes. In the 
Faces-Only condition responses were coded as 1 when participants 
selected the immature face and 0 when they selected the mature 
face. Thus, mean scores greater than 0.5 indicate that participants 
selected the immature vignettes (in the Faces+Vignettes conditions) 
or the immature faces (in the Faces-Only condition) more often, 
whereas scores less than 0.5 indicate that participants selected the 
mature vignettes (in the Faces+Vignettes conditions) or the mature 
faces (in the Faces-Only condition) more often. Initial analyses 
(two-tailed, single-sample t tests) indicated whether immature or 
mature children were selected signifi cantly different than expected 
by chance (.50) for each age × trait × condition × vignette-type 
cell (p < .05, adjusted for multiple contrasts). To assess further 
the pattern for the various age groups, conditions, and traits, we 
computed a series of ANOVAs, fi rst for the Faces-Only condition, 
and then for contrasting patterns between the Consistent and 
Inconsistent conditions.
       
Results
 
Table 1 presents the mean scores by age (Younger Adolescents, 
Older Adolescents), trait dimension (Positive Affect, Negative 
Affect, Intelligence, Helpless), and condition (Consistent, 
Inconsistent, Faces-Only), separately for Supernatural and Natural 
Table 1
Proportion of participants selecting the immature face (Faces-Only condition) or the child expressing immature cognition (other conditions) by trait dimension, 
condition, vignette type, and age group (standard deviations in parenthesis)
Positive affect Negative affect Intelligence Helpless
Super
Natural
Natural
Super
Natural
Natural
Super
 Natural
Natural
Super
Natural
Natural
Faces-Only
(n = 39)
Younger adolescents
 (10-13 years)
.67a (.15) .44 (.29) .50 (.31) .44 (.26)
(n = 45)
Older adolescents
 (14-17 years)
.66a (.21) .55 (.26) .49 (.23) .43 (.26)
(n = 66) Adults (Hernández Blasi et al., 2015) .68a (.21) .57 (.26) .51 (.26) .47 (.29)
Consistent
(n = 39)
Younger adolescents
 (10-13 years)
.58 (.29) .57 (.21) .65a (.27) .57 (.22) .13b (.24) .36b (.22) .67a (.29) .49 (.24)
(n = 44)
Older adolescents
 (14-17 years)
.71a (.24) .43 (.26) .54 (.32) .77a (.22) .10b (.20) .35b (.31) .76a (.26) .46 (.27)
(n = 60) Adults (Hernández Blasi et al., 2015) .72a (.27) .43 (.25) .56 (.29) .76a (.22) .17b (.27) .38 (.32) .76a (.31) .45 (.30)
Inconsistent
(n = 37)
Younger adolescents
 (10-13 years)
.44 (.26) .26b (.22) .65a (.23) .73a (.23) .14b (.22) .33b (.22) .67a (.30) .55 (.26)
(n = 41)
Older adolescents
 (14-17 years)
.62* (.31) .31b (.21) .46 (.35) .63* (.30) .10b (.21) .37b (.28) .85a (.26) .52 (.29)
(n = 55) Adults (Hernández Blasi et al., 2015) .59 (.29) .31b (.21) .48 (.31) .72a (.26) .17b (.22) .29b (.27) .79a (.29) .53 (.31)
Vignettes-Only
(n = 132)
Younger adolescents
 (10-13 years) (Periss et al., 2012)
.51 (.29) .40b (.29) .64a (.30) .65a (.32) .17b (.25) .28b (.41) .73a (.30) .46b (.35)
(n = 302)
Older adolescents
 (14-17 years) (Periss et al., 2012)
.65a (.31) .34b (.31) .57a (.34) .71a (.34) .11b (.27) .33b (.39) .80a (.31) .50 (.40)
(n = 151) Adults (Bjorklund et al., 2010)1 .68a (. 27) .28b (.24) .53 (.28) .81a (.21) .11b (.20) .36b (.34) .77a (.24) .28b (.26)
Note: a selecting an immature child signifi cantly greater than expected by chance; b selecting a mature child signifi cantly greater than expected by chance; p = .000-.006, 
excepting for *, where respectively p = .02 and .01; p = .002, for Bjorklund et al. (2010) and Periss et al. (2012); p < .001, for Hernández Blasi et al. (2015); 1Data organized 
on the basis of a different factor analyses from Bjorklund et al. (2010) (see note in Hernández Blasi et al., 2015, p. 519) 
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vignette-types. Table 1 also presents mean values for Spanish 
adult samples from both Bjorklund et al. (2010) and Hernández 
Blasi et al. (2015), and the Spanish adolescent sample from Periss 
et al. (2012). 
        
Faces-Only Condition 
 
Both younger and older adolescents selected the immature 
child signifi cantly greater than chance for the Positive-Affect 
trait dimension and exhibited no bias towards either child for the 
Negative-Affect, Intelligence, and Helpless traits. 
Consistent and Inconsistent Conditions
 
Supernatural vignettes.  For both the Consistent and Inconsistent 
conditions, older adolescents selected the immature child more 
frequently for the Positive-Affect trait and showed no bias towards 
either the mature or immature child for the Negative-Affect trait. 
Conversely, younger adolescents selected the immature child 
more often for the Negative-Affect trait and showed no bias for 
the Positive-Affect trait. For the Intelligence and Helpless traits, 
both groups selected signifi cantly more often the mature child for 
Intelligence and the immature child for the Helpless trait.
Natural vignettes. For the Inconsistent condition, both the 
younger and older adolescents performed comparably on the 
Positive-Affect and the Negative-Affect dimensions, with subjects 
selecting more often the mature child for Positive-Affect items 
and the immature child for Negative-Affect items. In contrast, in 
the Consistent condition both the younger and older adolescents 
failed to exhibit a bias towards either the mature or immature 
child on the Positive-Affect trait. For the Negative-Affect trait in 
the Consistent condition, older adolescents selected more often the 
immature child, but younger adolescents showed no bias towards 
either the mature or immature child.  
Contrasting Consistent, Inconsistent, and Faces-Only 
Conditions
 
A 2 (age) × 2 (gender of participant) × 2 (photo gender) × 4 (trait) 
ANOVA for the Faces-Only condition, with repeated measures on 
the Photo gender and Trait factors, produced a signifi cant main 
effect for Trait, F(2.56,189.37) = 9.39, p = .000, η
p
2=.11 (Positive 
Affect, M = .67 > Negative Affect, M = .50 = Intelligence, M 
= .49 = Helpless, M = .44), and Photo gender, F(1,74) = 9.25, p 
= .003,  η
p
2 = .11 (Photos of Boys, M = .54 > Photos of Girls, 
M= .50), as well as a signifi cant Trait × Photo gender interaction, 
F(2.49,184.53) = 6.98, p = .000, η
p
2 = .09, and a signifi cant Trait × 
Gender of participant interaction, F(3,74) = 4.25, p = .006,  η
p
2  =.05. 
Subsequent inspection of these interactions indicated a signifi cant 
Photo gender effect on the Positive-Affect (Photos of Boys, M = 
.73 > Photos of Girls, M = .60, p = .000) and Intelligence (Photos 
of Boys, M = .57 > Photos of Girls, M = .43, p = .000), but not 
on the Negative-Affect and Helpless traits. A signifi cant effect of 
Gender of participant was found on the Intelligence dimension 
(Males, M = .57 > Females, M= .41, p = .004). 
For the Consistent and Inconsistent conditions, a 2 (age) × 
2 (condition) × 2 (gender of participant) × 2 (vignette type) × 
4 (trait) ANOVA, with repeated measures on vignette type and 
trait was performed. The analysis produced a signifi cant main 
effect for Trait, F(2.55, 356.94) = 103.78, p = .000,  η
p
2 = .43 
(Negative Affect, M = .63 = Helpless, M = .62 > Positive Affect, 
M = .49 > Intelligence, M = .23), Vignette type, F(1,140) = 9.96, 
p = .002,  η
p
2 = .07 (Supernatural, M = .50 > Natural, M = .48), 
Condition, F(1,140) = 7.50, p = .007,  η
p
2 =.05 (Consistent, M = .51 
> Inconsistent, M = .48), and the following signifi cant interactions: 
Trait × Vignette type,  F(2.55,356.46) = 58.30, p = .000,  η
p
2 =.29; 
Trait × Condition, F(2.55,356.94) = 6.65, p = .001,  η
p
2 = .05; 
Gender of participant × Age,  F(1,140) = 5.22, p = .024,  η
p
2 =.04; 
Trait × Vignette type × Age, F(2.55,356.46) = 8.86, p = .000,  η
p
2 
=.06; and Trait × Condition × Age, F(2.55,356.95) = 3.92, p = .013, 
η
p
2 =.03.
Subsequent inspection of these interactions revealed 
three noticeable differences between the performance of the 
younger and older adolescents: (1) there was a slight effect 
of Gender of participant on global performance for younger 
adolescents, with females selecting the vignettes associated 
with the immature child more often than males (Females, M = 
.51 > Males, M = .41, p = .004), but not for older adolescents 
(Males, M = .50 = Females, M = .49); (2) whereas there were no 
differences for the Consistent condition between younger and 
older adolescents’ performance on any dimension (collapsed 
over vignettes type), there were differences for the Inconsistent 
condition, namely on Positive-Affect (Older Adolescents, M = 
.46 > Younger Adolescents, M = .35,  p = .018), and Negative-
Affect (Younger Adolescents, M = .70 > Older Adolescents, M 
= .55, p = .003) dimensions, but not on the Intelligence and 
Helpless dimensions; and (3) for the Supernatural vignettes 
there were signifi cant differences between younger and older 
adolescents (collapsed across the Consistent and Inconsistent 
conditions) for the Positive-Affect (Older Adolescents, M 
= .66 > Younger Adolescents, M = .51, p = .001), Negative-
Affect (Younger Adolescents, M = .65 > Older Adolescents, M 
= .50, p = .002), and Helpless (Older Adolescents, M = .80 > 
Younger Adolescents, M = .67, p = .004) dimensions, but not 
for the Intelligence dimension. There were no signifi cant age 
differences for the Natural vignettes.
Discussion
 
There were two major fi ndings from our study: First, 
hypothetical children’s cognitive cues had an overall greater impact 
on adolescents’ judgments than facial cues. Namely, in 13 of the 16 
outcomes, scores in the Consistent and the Inconsistent conditions 
were comparable and equivalent to those found by Periss et al. 
(2012) in a Vignettes-Only condition, for the same two age groups 
of adolescents studied here (see Table 1). This is quite likely the 
most noteworthy fi nding in this study, because it highlights again 
the dominance of children’s cognitive cues over physical cues in 
determining humans’ (this time adolescents’) reactions toward the 
preschool-age children emitting them.
Second, we found a developmental pattern similar to that 
reported by Periss et al. (2012), with older adolescents displaying 
the typical adult patterns for both the Natural and Supernatural 
vignettes, whereas the younger adolescents showed a different 
pattern. For the Supernatural vignettes, younger adolescents 
displayed a negative-affect bias toward the immature children and 
no bias toward either the mature or immature children for Positive 
Affect. In contrast, older adolescents replicated the adult pattern 
reported in Bjorklund et al. (2010) and Hernández Blasi et al. (2015), 
specifi cally a positive-affect bias toward the immature children and 
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no bias toward either the mature or immature children for negative-
affect items. For the Natural vignettes, there were some differences 
between conditions. Participants in the Inconsistent condition 
produced mainly the same pattern found for the Vignettes-Only 
condition in Periss et al. (2012), with both younger and older 
adolescents exhibiting a positive-affect bias towards the mature 
children and a negative-affect bias towards the immature children. 
Participants in the Consistent condition exhibited a different 
pattern, with both younger and older adolescents showing no 
positive-affect bias toward either the mature or immature children, 
whereas older adolescents exhibited a negative-affect bias towards 
the immature child, but younger adolescents showed no negative-
affect bias towards either the mature or immature children. The 
difference in positivity bias for immature supernatural thinking 
and the negativity bias for immature natural thinking between 
the younger and older adolescents can be seen in Figure 1, which 
shows the average difference between Positive- and Negative-
Affect scores. Results from adults from Hernández Blasi et al. 
(2015) are shown for comparison purposes.
This differential pattern between conditions suggests, fi rst, that 
the addition of an inconsistently matched child’s face to a vignette 
refl ecting natural cognition had no additional effect on adolescents’ 
reactions towards children, with participants apparently paying 
more attention to the cognitive cues than to the contradictory 
physical cues that were simultaneously presented. Second, the 
pattern of results suggests that the addition of a consistently matched 
child’s face to a vignette refl ecting natural cognition does have an 
interaction effect on adolescents’ reactions, apparently reducing 
a negative-affect bias during early adolescence toward children 
who verbalize immature cognition, as well as reducing a positive-
affect bias during both early and later adolescence towards mature 
children who verbalize cognitively competent cognition. This is 
the fi rst evidence in our studies of an interaction between cognitive 
and physical cues, suggesting that, at least regarding natural 
thinking during early adolescence, children are actually judged 
as a whole, with physical cues modulating the effects typically 
obtained when only cognitive cues are available. We currently do 
not have a satisfactory explanation for this fi nding, either from a 
developmental or an evolutionary perspective, making it worthy of 
replication and further study.
 How might one explain the differential reaction of older versus 
younger adolescents regarding the supernatural immaturity cues 
found in this study? One possibility is that supernatural immature 
reasoning evolved (jointly with other cognitive or/and non-
cognitive cues not yet identifi ed) to be a particularly signifi cant 
cue of children’s maturational status for older adolescents 
and adults, given their potential role as a parents and/or close 
caretakers, compared to younger adolescents (Periss et al., 2012). 
During early childhood language presumably becomes a more 
distinctive, powerful, and functionally effi cient way for children 
to convey critical information about themselves to their potential 
caregivers (albeit often implicitly), in comparison to both physical 
appearance and vocal cues, which are much more salient and 
informative during infancy. This interpretation is consistent 
with some theories within evolutionary biology (e.g., Dawkins & 
Guilford, 1991) that stress the importance that proper signaling 
between and within species has for survival and development.
The feasibility of this interpretation should be grounded on 
further research providing convergent evidence. We do not have 
yet data available, for example, about the sensitivity of both 
children younger than the ones studied here and adults in the 
post-childbearing years towards young children’s supernatural 
thinking, nor about how this sensitivity to young children’s 
supernatural thinking cues varies depending on the timing at 
puberty, and hence the real possibility of becoming a parent. In 
absence of further research, this interpretation remains speculative, 
with other potential explanations to our data open. For example, 
younger adolescences might have identifi ed themselves as closer 
in cognitive terms to children verbalizing mature thinking, and 
therefore perceived as more negative those immature children 
whom they do not resemble anymore, but still are not so removed 
from them, developmentally speaking, at least in contrast to older 
adolescents.
No developmental trend was found on the effects of viewing 
children’s faces on either the younger or older adolescents’ reactions. 
In the Faces-Only condition, both groups of adolescents reacted 
similarly when only faces were provided, namely, the immature 
faces produced signifi cantly higher ratings for the Positive-Affect 
items, whereas there was no bias demonstrated towards either 
a) Supernatural thinking
0,26
0,13
0
-0,13
-0,26
Younger
adolescents
Older adolescents Adults
Consistent Inconsistent
b) Natural thinking
0
-0,13
-0,25
-0,38
-0,5
Younger adolescents Older adolescents Adults
Figure 1. Mean difference between Positive-Affect and Negative-Affect 
scores for supernatural (a) and natural thinking (b) vignettes depending 
on whether they were or were not consistently matched with mature/
immature children’s faces. Positive values indicate greater positive than 
negative affect (bias toward immature thinking); negative values indicate 
greater negative than positive affect (bias toward mature thinking). Adult 
data from Hernández Blasi et al. (2015)
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child for the Negative-Affect, Intelligence, or Helpless dimensions. 
These results are equivalent to those reported for adults in 
previous studies (Hernández Blasi et al., 2015, 2017), suggesting 
that a positive bias towards immature preschool children’s faces 
is present at 10 years of age, 2 years earlier than described by 
Fullard and Reiling (1976) for “baby-like” faces in their study. 
Faces of children seem to be an early, pervasive, and powerful cue 
of children’s status in both infancy and early childhood (Franklin 
& Volk, 2017), although in the latter case: 1) their effects are less 
critical for provoking positive reactions of both adolescents and 
adults than some forms of verbalized information (immature 
supernatural thinking); 2) they seem to interact with other forms 
of verbalized utterances (natural thinking in younger adolescents); 
and, 3) contrary to what has typically been found in infancy (e.g., 
Glocker et al., 2009), they do not seem to be enough by themselves 
to infl uence decisions on children’s helplessness status, nor, for 
adults, on negative-affect and intelligence trait attributions.
Some signifi cant gender and photo gender interactions were found 
for the Faces-Only condition, but again, similar to the only gender 
effect found on the Faces+Vignettes condition, and to some of the 
gender effects found in previous studies (e.g., Bjorklund et al., 2010), 
they are minor, do not change the general pattern of results, and are 
often diffi cult to interpret (e.g., male adolescents rating children with 
immature faces more intelligent, M = .57, whereas female adolescents 
rating children with mature faces more intelligent, M = .41). 
Results from this study indicate that, from early to late 
adolescence, an increased sensitivity toward preschoolers’ 
expressions of supernatural thinking develops, increasing 
both positive affect and helplessness feelings toward them, and 
therefore the chance that corresponding caregiving behaviors 
occur. This effect is seen regardless if the faces of these children 
are available. Immature physical appearance by itself generates 
a positive-affect reaction in adolescents regardless of their age, 
but does not seem to be enough to make adult-like judgments on 
Helpless, Intelligence, and Negative-Affect traits. However, when 
combined with preschool children’s expressions of immature 
natural thinking, physical appearance seems to have the power 
of moderating negative-affect reactions towards the children 
uttering them, at least during early adolescence. Overall this 
research reinforces the signifi cance of supernatural thinking as 
a psychological marker of children’s maturity status during early 
childhood, beginning in late adolescence.
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